



Instituto Rio Branco

CONCURSO PÚBLICO

ADMISSÃO À CARREIRA DE DIPLOMATA

TERCEIRA FASE PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

LEIA COM ATENÇÃO AS INFORMAÇÕES ABAIXO.

- 1 Este caderno contém a Prova Escrita de Inglês, que consiste: na tradução de um texto do inglês para o português; na tradução de um texto do português para o inglês; na redação de um resumo de um texto; e na redação a respeito de tema de ordem geral.
- 2 Neste caderno, constam páginas para rascunho, cujo uso é opcional; não contarão, portanto, para efeito de avaliação. Todas as respostas devem ser inteiramente transcritas para o Caderno de Textos Definitivos.
- 3 Caso o caderno esteja incompleto ou tenha qualquer defeito, solicite ao fiscal de sala mais próximo que tome as providências cabíveis, pois não serão aceitas reclamações posteriores.
- 4 A legibilidade será considerada na avaliação da prova. Portanto, tenha atenção com o formato de letras e demais notações. Não use marcas ou sinais que não integrem o sistema gráfico do português ou do inglês. A escrita deve ser contínua, sem linhas em branco, mesmo entre parágrafos.
- 5 O limite mínimo e o máximo de palavras para a redação a respeito de tema de ordem geral serão considerados na avaliação e devem ser rigorosamente respeitados.
- 6 As respostas devem caracterizar-se por objetividade, clareza, precisão e concisão, devendo ser evitado o emprego de preciosismos, clichês e circunlóquios.
- 7 Os textos devem obedecer aos padrões da modalidade escrita culta da língua portuguesa ou inglesa e do gênero textual correspondente a cada questão desta prova.
- 8 Não utilize borracha, lápis, lapiseira (grafite) ou qualquer material de consulta que não seja fornecido pelo CESPE/UnB.
- 9 Não serão distribuídas folhas suplementares para rascunho nem para textos definitivos.
- 10 Durante a prova, não se comunique com outros candidatos nem se levante sem autorização do chefe de sala.
- 11 A duração da prova é de **quatro horas**, já incluído o tempo destinado à identificação — que será feita no decorrer da prova — e à transcrição dos textos para as respectivas folhas do Caderno de Textos Definitivos.
- 12 É obrigatória a permanência em sala por, no mínimo, **uma hora** após o início da prova, e este caderno de prova somente poderá ser levado pelo candidato no decurso dos últimos **quinze minutos** anteriores ao horário determinado para o término da prova.
- 13 Ao terminar a prova, chame o fiscal de sala mais próximo, devolva-lhe o Caderno de Textos Definitivos e deixe o local de prova.
- 14 Será anulado o texto definitivo escrito a lápis ou escrito em local indevido ou que tenha identificação do candidato fora do local apropriado.
- 15 A desobediência a qualquer determinação constante em edital, no presente caderno ou no Caderno de Textos Definitivos poderá implicar a anulação da sua prova.

OBSERVAÇÕES

- Não serão conhecidos recursos em desacordo com o estabelecido em edital.
- Informações adicionais: telefone 0(XX) 61 3448-0100; Internet — www.cespe.unb.br.
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PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS

- Na prova a seguir, faça o que se pede, usando, caso julgue necessário, as páginas para rascunho constantes deste caderno. Em seguida, transcreva os textos para as respectivas folhas do **CADERNO DE TEXTOS DEFINITIVOS DA PROVA ESCRITA DE INGLÊS**, nos locais apropriados, pois **não serão avaliados fragmentos de texto escritos em locais indevidos**. No resumo, assim como na redação a respeito de tema de ordem geral, respeite os limites mínimo e máximo de palavras estabelecidos.
- No **caderno de textos definitivos**, identifique-se apenas na capa, pois **não serão avaliados** os textos que tenham qualquer assinatura ou marca identificadora fora do local apropriado.

TRANSLATION

(Total: 35 marks)

PART A (20 marks)

Translate into Portuguese the following excerpt adapted from Isabel Hilton's review of **The Opium Wars** by Julia Lovell, published in **The Guardian** on 11th September 2011.

The Opium Wars were an inglorious episode on both sides. They were triggered by an upstart imperial power being snubbed and rebuffed in its quest for trade: there was nothing, the Chinese loftily told the British emissaries, which China needed or wanted from the West — not their goods, not their ideas, and definitely not their company.

In March 1839, Canton commissioner Lin Zexu, hot from arresting 1,600 opium smokers and confiscating a full 14 tonnes of the narcotic, ordered foreign merchants to hand over their stocks and undertake to bring no more. The British agreed to relinquish over 20,000 chests of premium Bengal-grown opium, assuring merchants all the while that the crown would make good their losses, thus transforming the dispute into an affair of state. Lin reported to Emperor Daoguang that matters had been satisfactorily concluded. Months later, somewhat to his amazement, the British gunboats arrived.

A motley cast of characters played their part in the ensuing tragicomedy: bungling officials, rogue merchants, unscrupulous politicians, muscular military imperialists and the dithering, bewildered emperor.

Internet: <www.guardian.co.uk> (adapted).

PART B (15 marks)

Translate into English the following excerpt adapted from Maurício Carvalho Lyrio's study "A ascensão da China como potência".

Historiadores e sinólogos convergem na avaliação de que a civilização chinesa impressiona não apenas por sua longevidade, mas também e principalmente por sua grandeza econômica e política ao longo de boa parte da história, quando comparada a outras civilizações antigas e modernas.

Francis Bacon observou que o mundo seiscentista se recriava pela pólvora, pela prensa e pelo ímã. Omitiu o fato, no entanto, de que todos os três foram descobertos séculos antes na China.

Malgrado seu *status* de economia mais pujante do mundo ao longo de três milênios, em 1829, já se vislumbravam os primeiros indícios da queda abrupta que apeguenaria a economia chinesa diante das rivais europeias no século seguinte. Passadas sucessivas décadas de declínio relativo, a produção industrial chinesa era, nos anos 1930, menor do que a da Bélgica. Já sua produção de aparelhos e equipamentos não ultrapassava a de um estado do meio-oeste norte-americano.

M. C. Lyrio. *A ascensão da China como potência: fundamentos políticos internos*. Brasília: FUNAG, 2010, p. 16-8.

SUMMARY

(Total: 15 marks)

Write a summary, in your own words, of the following excerpt adapted from Michael Glosny's 2010 *Polity* paper "China and the BRICs". (Length: no more than 200 words)

Despite fundamental differences between the four countries and structural constraints of unipolarity that might have kept them from cooperating, the BRICs have surpassed most expectations in recent years in forming a nascent political grouping. On the foundation of other meetings between newly emerging powers, most importantly the trilateral Russia-India-China (RIC) arrangement, the BRIC foreign ministers began meeting in 2006. BRIC cooperation expanded to include two finance ministers' summits, meetings of leaders, and a stand-alone BRIC leaders' summit in June 2009, which produced a joint communiqué. Russia and Brazil have been the driving forces responsible for transforming the BRICs from an abstract financial concept into a genuine political grouping. However, the Chinese have also agreed to participate and cooperate. In a lengthy interview on the BRICs on the eve of the summit, Director-General Wu Hailong of the International Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the BRIC grouping as an "evolution from a hypothetical into a realistic platform for international cooperation."

As the world's second largest economy, a nuclear weapons state, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves, and a rising power whose influence is spreading across the globe, China has already been acknowledged as a superpower by the rest of the world. Having China as a partner has helped raise the profile of the other three BRICs partners, but China itself is less reliant on this association. However logical this cooperation may be, it is also costly and risky. As Chinese leaders' time is limited and valuable, participation in meetings has an opportunity cost. Moreover, China also risks being perceived as participating in a political bloc designed to challenge and undermine the U.S. and the western liberal order.

For China, cooperation with the BRICs has occurred under the structural constraints of unipolarity, which provide it with an incentive to cooperate with the U.S. and ensure its behavior is not seen as a threat to which the hyper-sensitive hegemon might feel prompted to respond. However, China has benefited from its cooperation with the BRICs in significant ways. Looking forward, one of the major challenges for China in its engagement with the BRICs is how to maximize its benefits from cooperation while doing its utmost to make sure the U.S. does not perceive its cooperation with the BRICs as a threat. Zhao Gancheng, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, perfectly captures this dilemma in his analysis of BRIC cooperation. He argues that "[China's] objective is through cooperation, to strengthen its position in the international system, but concomitantly to endeavor not to challenge the U.S. in a confrontational mode." China does not see its cooperation with the BRICs as part of an anti-U.S. hard balancing coalition. Were anyone to attempt to move the BRICs in that direction, China would oppose the move, as would other member states. Despite the significance of BRIC cooperation, fundamental differences among the BRICs, the continued relevance of the U.S., and intra-BRIC competition and rivalry seriously limit the extent to which further BRIC cooperation can go. Looking to the future, as the U.S. declines and the BRICs continue to rise, it is very possible that intra-BRIC competition and rivalry will become fierce, further curbing cooperation among the member states.

U.S. policy is an important factor that could potentially overcome such limitations and push the BRICs toward more far-reaching cooperation. If the U.S. views limited BRIC cooperation as an anti-U.S. bloc and so adopts a more hostile policy towards this “alliance,” it may drive these countries closer together and thus create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Moreover, were the U.S. and other western countries to spurn BRIC demands for limited changes in the international order, the BRICs might well become disillusioned, see themselves as forced to mount a sweeping challenge, and seek to replace it with an order more suited to their interests. Thus far, this scenario seems unlikely. Western countries have started to show themselves to be more receptive to the idea of reforming the order and accommodating some of the BRIC demands. Although negotiation on reforming the international order is likely to be a drawn-out and difficult process, the willingness of western countries to entertain BRIC proposals should enhance the BRICs’ satisfaction with the international order, and so make them more likely to act as “responsible stakeholders.” That would put paid to the prospect of them challenging the status quo.

Looking ahead, China’s power will likely provide a challenge to BRIC cooperation and the BRICs as a grouping. Although the other three powers have garnered prestige by their association with the rising Chinese juggernaut, analysts have begun to suggest that China’s overwhelming power relative to the other three will eventually undermine the BRICs as a coherent grouping. For instance, recent unofficial calls for a Sino-American G2 designed to address global challenges and manage the global order suggest China is no longer an emerging power or a developing country. However much this may raise concern for BRIC coherence, China is already much more powerful than the other BRICs by most measures. Moreover, its advantages have not hobbled the positive momentum of BRIC cooperation. Besides, although foreign analysts may call for a G2, Premier Wen Jiabao and most Chinese experts have criticized the concept as inappropriate and unworkable, arguing that China is too weak to shoulder such responsibility whilst recognizing that endorsing the idea would harm China’s diplomacy, isolating it from the developing world. In fact, rather than being eager to be seen as part of a G2 leading and managing the world, China’s leaders are more than glad to continue to keep a relatively low profile as a developing country, to cooperate with other emerging powers, and to benefit from this cooperation, all the while studiously avoiding being seen as standing up to the United States.

Michael A. Glosny. **China and the BRICs: a real (but limited) partnership in a unipolar world.** In: *Polity*, v. 42, n.º 1, January 2010, 100-29. Internet: <www.palgrave-journals.com> (adapted).

COMPOSITION**(Total: 50 marks)**

In the joint declaration at the conclusion of the 4th BRICS Summit, the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa vowed to enhance mutual cooperation and contribute to world development and prosperity. The summit has come at a crucial moment, as the global economic recovery is still dragging its feet, entangled by fragile financial systems, high public and private debt, high unemployment and the rising price of oil. Pressing issues, such as climate change, food security and energy security also pose grave challenges. "BRICS cooperation now stands at a new starting point," declared President Hu Jintao, adding that the five emerging economies need to build on current cooperation and blaze new trails so as to inject vitality into their mechanism and so usher in a more just, fair and reasonable international political and economic order.

China Daily, 30th March 2012. Internet: <www.chinadaily.com> (adapted).

Taking due account of the text above and of China's strategic objectives, comment on how its participation in the BRICS might fit into this framework.

(Length: 400-450 words)

**TRANSLATION
PART A
RASCUNHO – 1/2**

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**TRANSLATION
PART A
RASCUNHO – 2/2**

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**TRANSLATION
PART B
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**TRANSLATION
PART B
RASCUNHO – 2/2**

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SUMMARY**RASCUNHO – 1/2**

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SUMMARY**RASCUNHO – 2/2**

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COMPOSITION**RASCUNHO – 1/2**

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COMPOSITION**RASCUNHO – 2/2**

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